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The GNU General Public License:
Constitutional Subversion?
by TENNILLE M. CHRISTENSEN*
Introduction
The General Public License ("GPL") is the cornerstone of the
Free Software movement, and the license governing the source code
that makes up the Linux operating system.' Unlike proprietary
software,' which is generally only distributed in machine readable
executable code, software licensed under the GPL, if distributed,
must be made available by the provider to anyone who receives the
software in the form of human-readable source code, which can then
be compiled into machine executable code.3 The effect of this
requirement is that software solutions distributed under the GPL may
not be kept secret because anyone who can read source code is free to
view the solution or modify it as they please.
* Ms. Christensen is a fifth-generation Californian who holds a B.S. in Bioengineering
from U.C. Berkeley (1999) and a J.D. from U.C. Hastings College of the Law (2006). Her
exposure to open source software in the late 1990's and early 2000's piqued her interest in
the intersection of law and technology and evenutally led her to law school. She would
like to thank Professor Jeffrey A. Lefstin and the editorial staff of Hastings Constitutional
Law Journal for their invaluable input in the preparation of this note. Additionally, she
would like to thank the law firm of Foley and Lardner for sposoring the 6th Annual
Intellectual Property writing contest and selecting this paper for honorable mention.
Finally, she would like to thank her entire family for their support and encouragement and
particularly her husband, Nolan Leake, for his love and tolerance during the sleepless
months of the second year of law school when the bulk of this note was written.
1. GNU General Public License, Version 2 (1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/
gpl.txt.
2. "The word proprietary is often confused with the word commercial. But a
commercial license - which is merely a term used to describe a license used in commerce
- can be either open source or proprietary." LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE
LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 52 (2005)
(emphases added).
3. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1.
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The GPL is often described as "copyleft"' because where typical
copyright licenses vest control over the creation in the creator, the
GPL requires that, when copyrighted works are distributed, it is
without limitation on who can use them, and who can see how they
work.' Although a German court recently held the GPL to be
enforceable,6 the GPL has never been fully litigated for enforceability
in the United States.'
Allegations of Unconstitutionality
On March 3, 2003, the SCO Group filed a complaint in Utah
state court accusing IBM of unfair competition, and specifically, "of
incorporating (and inducing, encouraging, and enabling others to
incorporate) SCO's proprietary software into open source software
offerings."8 Predictably, IBM filed counterclaims. On October 24,
2003, the SCO Group filed an answer to IBM's counterclaims alleging
that "[t]he GPL violates the U.S. Constitution, together with
copyright, antitrust, and export control laws . . . .,9" These
allegations were summarily dismissed by the Free Software and Open
Source communities." SCO's April 24, 2004 filing in response to
IBM's amended counterclaims does not explicitly claim that the GPL
is unconstitutional: rather, SCO argues that the GPL is
"unenforceable, void, or voidable.' 2 However, despite their apparent
4. Richard Stallman, The GNU Project, http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html.
5. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1.
6. Landgericht [LG] Muinchen I [Dist. Ct. I Munich] May 19, 2004, docket no. 21 0
6123/04, available at http://www.jbb.de/urteil-lg-muenchen-gpl.pdf, translated at
http://www.jbb.de/judgment dc-munich-gpl.pdf.
7. Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1511 n.137 (1997). See generally infra notes 17-28.
8. SCO's Complaint, SCO Group v. IBM, No. 030905199 (Utah 3d Dist. filed Mar. 3,
2003), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/IBM-819ExA.pdf.
9. SCO's Answer to IBM's Amended Counterclaims at 16, SCO Group v. IBM, No.
03-CV-0294 (D. Utah filed Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/
AnswerAmendCC.10-24-03.pdf.
10. From the date of filing until at least March 9, 2005, SCO's legal filings in the case
were available to the public at http://www.sco.com/ibmlawsuit. As of March 17, 2005, all
English references to the IBM lawsuit have been removed from the SCO website.
11. See, e.g., SCO: GPL Unconstitutional. Lawyers Scratch Heads, NEWS.OSDIR,
Oct. 29, 2003, http://web.archive.org/web/20050305120323/http://news.osdir.com/
article311.html; LinuxWorld News Desk, SCO's GPL position is "Just Invalid" Says
Professor, LINUXWORLD, Dec. 4, 2003, http://web.archive.org/web/20040217085236/
http://www.linuxworld.com/story/38115.htm.
12. SCO's Answer to IBM's Second Amended Counterclaims at 20, SCO Group v.
IBM, No. 03-CV-0294 (D. Utah filed Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.groklaw.net/
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capitulation, on April 30, 2004, SCO executives claimed to be
continuing their pursuit of the unconstitutionality of the GPL as a
defense to IBM's counterclaims.
1 3
Since filing the lawsuit, SCO has suffered large losses and has
been notified that NASDAQ intends to delist them.1 4 Although the
lawsuit against IBM is still pending, the district court's order denying
IBM's motion for summary judgment indicates that SCO's case-to-
date suffers from a severe lack of evidentiary support.5 Given SCO's
financial position and the district court's order precluding any further
dispositive motions until after the close of discovery, 6 it is unlikely
that the constitutionality of the GPL will be litigated in the SCO-IBM
suit in the near future, if at all.
This note addresses the two main areas of argument surrounding
the constitutionality of the GPL: (1) that its enforcement as a bare
license17 is unconstitutional because the GPL circumvents the
copyright clause of the United States Constitution; (2) that its
enforcement as a binding contract is unconstitutional because the
state law upholding the GPL is preempted by United States
Copyright law.
History and Overview of the GPL
The GPL evolved during 1985-1989 out of Richard M. Stallman's
interactions with proprietary software vendors regarding Emacs code
that he believed was freely available and they believed was
proprietary. Stallman created the first Emacs, a human-readable
pdf/IBM-141-1.pdf.
13. Steven J. Vaughan Nichols, SCO Still Contends GPL is Unconstitutional, EWEEK,
Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1581586,00.asp.
14. SCO Investor Relations, The SCO Group Inc., Receives Notice From Nasdaq
Regarding Potential Delisting and Intends to Appeal, Feb. 17, 2005, http://ir.sco.com/
ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD=156192.
15. Memorandum Decision and Order at 10-11, SCO Group v. IBM, No. 2:03CV294
DAK (D. Utah filed Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/IBM-398.pdf
("Nevertheless, despite the vast disparity between SCO's public accusations and its actual
evidence-or complete lack thereof-and the resulting temptation to grant IBM's motion,
the court has determined that it would be premature to grant summary judgment on
IBM's Tenth Counterclaim.").
16. Id. at 16.
17. In the software licensing context, a bare license is defined as: "A grant by the
holder of a copyright or patent to another of any of the rights embodied in the copyright
or patent short of an assignment of all rights." ROSEN, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996)).
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code editor, in 1976.8 In 1981, James Gosling wrote his own version
of Emacs ("Gosling Emacs")."9 In May of 1983, Unipress Software
released a proprietary version of Gosling Emacs, based upon
Gosling's claimed copyright to the code, called Unipress Emacs. 20
In 1985, Stallman released GNU Emacs, utilizing some of the C
code from Gosling Emacs.2" Stallman claims that he had permission
from Gosling to utilize the code.22 Unipress threatened legal action
based on Gosling's copyright against Stallman and the Free Software
Foundation,' 3 so Stallman was forced to stop distributing GNU Emacs
until he could replace all of the code that was originally written by
Gosling.24
In 1989, the Free Software Foundation, founded by Stallman as a
result of his Emacs experiences, released the first version of the GNU
General Public License.25 The GPL is described as "copyleft"
because it flips copyright law to serve the opposite purpose than it
normally serves in the field of software - "instead of a means of
privatizing software, it becomes a means of keeping software free."26
"[T]he GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your
freedom to share and change free software - to make sure the
software is free for all its users. 27 The license aims to exercise control
over the distribution of derivative or collective works based on
18. Jamie Zawinski, Emacs Timeline, June 21, 2005, http://www.jwz.org/doc/emacs-
timeline.html.
19. Id.; THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/
Gosling+Emacs (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (definition of "Gosling Emacs").
20. Zawinski, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Richard M. Stallman, Lecture at Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm,
Sweden, Oct. 30, 1986, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/stallman-kth.html ("[A] friend of
mine told me that because of his work in early development of Gosling Emacs, he had
permission from Gosling in a message he had been sent to distribute his version of that.
Gosling originally had set up his Emacs and distributed it free and gotten many people to
help develop it, under the expectation based on Gosling's own words in his own manual
that he was going to follow the same spirit that I started with the original Emacs. Then he
stabbed everyone in the back by putting copyrights on it, making people promise not to
redistribute it and then selling it to a software-house.").
23. Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
24. Free Software, The History of the GPL, July 4, 2001, http://www.free-soft.org/
gplhistory/.
25. The GNU General Public License, Version 1.0 (1989), http://www.gnu.org/
copyleft/copying-l.0.html.
26. Stallman, supra note 4.
27. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, Preamble.
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previously GPL-licensed code, not completely original works.'
The GPL is the license behind the GNU C language compiler
("GCC") 29 and Linux, the most popular free open source operating
system.0 Arguably, these two works make the GPL the keystone of
the entire Open Source Community because the three things that
most programmers need are: hardware (the computer), a compiler
(GCC) to convert human readable source code into executable code,
and an operating system (Linux) to facilitate the running of
executable code on the hardware. Because GCC is licensed under the
GPL, anyone who wishes to understand how human readable code is
converted into machine executable code can see the inner workings
and modify their own version of the compiler if they so choose.
Similarly, because Linux is licensed under the GPL, anyone who
wishes to understand how the Linux operating system interacts with
the hardware itself, or other programs, can view every line of the
human readable code that defines its operations and modify it in any
way they choose.
This model is different from the model employed by proprietary
operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows,31 and proprietary
compilers, such as Visual Studio,32 Microsoft's multi-language
compiler. Unlike GCC and Linux, with Microsoft Windows and
Visual Studio, the programmer is not allowed to see, modify, or learn
from the human readable code that governs the machine executable
code behind the operating system and compiler. The proprietary
model centralizes control with the copyright holder such that
programmers are dependent upon the copyright holder or vendor for
changes to core functionality. In contrast, the GPL decentralizes
control and allows each programmer to make their own changes.
Linus Torvalds, the original creator of Linux, has compared the open
source model to the scientific method, saying, "[E]ngineering and
science are all about the open-source method. It's mainly about
knowledge and information. You can spread it without losing it
yourself."33
28. Id. at § 2.
29. The GCC Team, GCC Development Mission Statement, Apr. 22, 1999,
http://gcc.gnu.org/gccmission.html.
30. Linux Online!, http://www.linux.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
31. Microsoft Windows, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/default.mspx (last visited
Oct. 9,2006).
32. Microsoft Visual Studio, http://msdn.microsoft.com/vstudio/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
33. Business Week Online, Linus Torvald's Benevolent Dictatorship, Aug. 18, 2004,
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One popular Linux distribution allows the user to select from
over 8,000 software packages licensed under the GPL.3' This includes
several GPL-licensed alternatives to popular proprietary software
programs such as desktop word processing programs,3" desktop
31spreadsheet and calculator programs,36 email and calendar programs,
and web browsers.
Although much of the software governed by the GPL is
distributed without charge,39 the GPL does not prohibit charging
money for distributions of GPL-licensed code. The philosophy of
"free," meaning freedom, not price, is stated in the preamble to the
GPL:
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom,
not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free
software (and charge for this service if you wish), that you
receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you can
change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs;
and that you know you can do these things.4°
Indeed, operative provisions of the GPL give the receiver of a
GPL-licensed work the freedom to make and distribute copies of the
work,4' require that source code of any distributed GPL-licensed work
must be made available to the receivers of the work,42 allow for
modification of GPL-licensed works,43 and require that the license be
displayed to receivers of GPL-licensed works.' In keeping with this
idea, several profitable businesses simultaneously comply with the
GPL's "freedom" requirements while charging for distribution,
hardware, or support-services.3
http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/aug2004/tc24O8l8-l593.htm?tc.
34. Debian, http://www.debian.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
35. Abisource, http://www.abisource.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
36. Gnumeric, http://www.gnome.org/projects/gnumeric/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
37. Evolution, http://gnome.org/projects/evolution/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
38. Konqueror, http://www.konqueror.org (last visited Oct. 9,2006).
39. GNU FAQ, Does the GPL allow me to sell copies of the program for money?,
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.html#DoesTheGPLAllowMoney (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
40. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, Preamble.
41. Id. at § 1.
42. Id. at § 3.
43. Id. at § 2.
44. Id. at § 1.
45. See Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (distributing Red
Hat Linux, which includes the Linux operating system as well as a collection of
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Unlike most copyright licenses, the GPL allows anyone to copy
and distribute exact copies of the works that it covers as long as an
appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty are included
in the distributed copy.46 This license term is unusual because most
copyright licenses are written to prevent distribution of copies
without compensation to the copyright holder. It is important to
make the distinction between placing an obligation on the receiver
and giving the receiver permission: the GPL does not require
distribution of copies, but it does allow anyone who receives a copy to
distribute as many copies as they wish.47
It is axiomatic that a copyright holder is free to donate her work
to the public.48 Section one of the GPL, which codifies this choice, is
not the subject of much controversy. The more controversial GPL
terms, however, are those that apply to derivative works based upon
GPL-licensed works. Generally, in order to modify and distribute a
derivative work of a GPL-licensed work, the author must: (1) place a
conspicuous notice on the files showing that they were changed, and
by whom; (2) license the modified work as a whole under the GPL at
no charge to any third parties who receive the software from the
author who created the modified version; and (3) if the modified
program runs in an interactive manner, it must display an appropriate
copyright notice, disclaimer of warranty, notice that users may
redistribute the program under the GPL, and instruction on how to
view a copy of the GPL.49 It is because of these terms that the GPL is
often referred to as "viral," because it "infects," or subjects all
modified works to the GPL, which in turn subjects all modified works
of modified works to the GPL, and so on.50
Some corporate software manufacturers avoid releasing any
software under the GPL because they fear it may "infect" their other,
applications to run on the operating system); IBM, http://ww-l.ibm.comllinux/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2006) (distributing Red Hat Linux on IBM hardware running propriety
software industry-specific software applications, and providing professional services and
support); Hewlett Packard, http://hl0018.wwwl.hp.com/wwsolutions/linux/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2006) (distributing Novell and Red Hat Linux on Hewlett Packard hardware);
Novell, http://www.novell.com/products/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (distributing Novell
Linux Desktop, the Linux operating system, and a suite of desktop applications including
the GPL-licensed mail and a calendar program); Evolution, supra note 37.
46. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 1.
47. Id. at § 2.
48. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
49. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1.
50. WIKIPEDIA Copyleft, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyleft (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
non-GPL-licensed software by turning it into a derivative work if the
non-GPL-licensed and GPL-licensed software work together, for
example." The GPL does not purport to extend its terms to works
that "can be reasonably considered independent and separate works
in themselves. 52  However, because the GPL has not yet been
litigated, no one knows exactly what type of separation is required in
order to ensure that the non-GPL-licensed code is not considered to
be GPL-licensed by its association with GPL-licensed code.
It is no surprise that the strongest arguments against the GPL's
constitutionality focus on the GPL's terms governing derivative
works. In general, a bare license of intellectual property rights is a
transfer of a subset of the intellectual property rights held by the
owner.53 When the GPL is viewed as a bare license, it is seen, in part,
as a limited grant by the copyright holder of the rights to distribute
derivative works. Opponents of the GPL argue that the bare license
is a conditional grant to distribute derivative works that subverts the
Founding Fathers' intent in framing the copyright clause. In contrast,
when the GPL is viewed as a binding contract or condition precedent,
the aggrieved party's action is for breach of contract under state law.
Critics of the GPL argue that its enforcement as a contract suffers
from the same inherent unconstitutionality regarding derivative
works as the bare license, but that it is further unconstitutional
because state enforcement of the GPL is preempted by the Copyright
Act.
Case Law Addressing the GPL
In May of 2004, a district court in Munich, Germany, granted an
injunction against the distribution of GPL-licensed software in a
manner that was contrary to its terms. 4 Key to its analysis was the
German court's determination that the GPL did not circumvent the
German Copyright Act.55 To date, no United States court has
performed a parallel analysis of the GPL's constitutionality by
addressing, for example, whether the GPL circumvents the Copyright
51. Phil Albert, GPL: Viral Infection or Just Your Imagination?, MAC NEWS WORLD,
May 25, 2004, http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/33968.html.
52. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 2.
53. THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/license
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (definition of "License").
54. Landgericht [LG] Minchen I [Dist. Ct. I Munich] May 19, 2004, docket no. 21 0
6123/04, at 11-13, available at http://www.jbb.de/urteillg-muenchen-gpl.pdf, translated at
http://www.jbb.de/judgment-dc-munich-gpl.pdf.
55. Id.
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Clause, or whether its enforcement is preempted by the United States
Copyright Act. Rather, a few courts have dealt with the GPL in the
context of other conflicts and refrained from addressing its possible
problems.
In Progress Software Corp. v MySQL, a United States district
court denied a motion for preliminary injunction based on the GPL
because MySQL failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable harm. 6 There, the court appeared to assume that the
GPL might be enforceable as a contract, but found the parties'
affidavits to establish a factual dispute as to whether the software at
issue was covered by the GPL.57 Furthermore, the court opined that
even if MySQL could show a likelihood of success on the merits, it
could not demonstrate the requisite irreparable harm for a
preliminary injunction. 8 The court based this finding upon Progress's
stipulation that future distribution of the software at issue would be
under terms similar, if not identical, to the GPL.59
In 2004, a different set of GPL-based claims was sidestepped by
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Computer
Associates International v. Quest Software.6° In that case, Quest
challenged the validity of Computer Associates' ("CA") copyright to
its EDBA source code by claiming that the EDBA source code was a
derivative work of a GPL-licensed work, called Bison. 6' The court
commenced its analysis with an assumption that GPL was a binding
contract:
Any user of that code is, however, bound by the terms of the
GNU General Public License (GPL). The GPL puts restrictions
on the modification and subsequent distribution of freeware
programs. Essentially, once the programs are freely released
into the public domain, the creators intend for them to stay
free. Defendants claim that plaintiff's [sic] are violating the
GPL by attempting to claim a copyright in a program that
contains Bison source code.62
While this statement appears to show the court's opinion that the
GPL is valid and enforceable, it merely allowed the court to dispose




60. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
61. Id. at 698.
62. Id. at 697-98.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of the GPL claims in the easiest manner possible. The court
determined that CA was not trying to lay copyright claim to the Bison
source code (the copyrighted material), but rather, that CA used
Bison as a program in executable form to create new source code.63
In order to create the new source code, CA modified the Bison
source code. 64 The court found that "Itihe GPL would prevent
plaintiff from attempting to claim a copyright in that modified version
of Bison.' '65 But, CA did not claim any rights to the modified version
of Bison. Instead, CA claimed copyright to the output file created by
the modified version of Bison, which was governed by an explicit
exception to the GPL, and the court used this exception to dismiss the
claims: "/* As a special exception, when this file is copied by Bison
into a Bison output file, you may use that output file without
restriction. This special exception was added by the Free Software
Foundation in version 1.24 of Bison */." 66
Thus, while the district courts in Progress Software and Computer
Associates assumed arguendo that the GPL was constitutional and
enforceable, they did so in order to eliminate the GPL-based claims
for other, more straightforward, reasons. Given its ubiquity in the
world of open source software, future conflicts regarding the GPL are
certain to arise. In particular, those who wish to be relieved of their
apparent obligations under the GPL will certainly argue that it is
unenforceable, and in doing so, raise the specter of the GPL's
unconstitutionality in a manner similar to SCO.
The GPL and the Copyright Clause
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress
shall have Power .... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
67
Congress first exercised this power in 1790, by enacting the first
federal copyright statute granting an initial copyright term of fourteen
years, which could be extended for another term of fourteen years if
the author survived the first term.68 Subsequently, Congress extended




67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
68. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat 124 (repealed 1831).
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and altered the federal copyright term on four major occasions.6
Most recently, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
("CTEA"), passed in 1998, extended the copyright term to the length
of the author's life plus seventy years for all works created after
January 1, 1978.70 Additionally, the copyright term for works for hire,
pseudonymous works, and anonymous works was extended to 95
years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires
first.7'
In 2002, the Supreme Court heard arguments from a group that
challenged the constitutionality of CTEA because the term extension
applied not only to newly created works but also to existing
copyrighted works and, therefore, they argued that it extended the
previously "limited time" of the existing copyright terms.72 The Court
held that CTEA was an appropriate exercise of Congress's
constitutional power to determine copyright terms for limited times,
and further stated that, "the 'constitutional command' ... is that
Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a
'system' that 'promotes the Progress of Science.' 73  Behind this
command is the understanding that "the Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression., 74 Indeed, James Madison
saw that the grant of power to Congress to establish copyright terms
redounded benefit to both the creator of the copyrighted work and to
the public at large:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great
Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals.
When the GPL functions as a bare license, it gives permission to
the receiver of the GPL-licensed work to distribute the GPL-licensed
work according to its terms.76 However, the GPL can also function as
an offer from the copyright owner to the receiver whereby the offered
69. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2003).
70. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
71. Id.
72. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
73. Id. at 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
74. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1788).
76. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 1.
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exchange, or quid pro quo, is the permission to distribute the
copyrighted work in exchange for a promise to distribute the
copyrighted work, if at all, according to the terms of the GPL.77
If the receiver of the GPL-licensed work opts not to accept the
license terms, but instead chooses to distribute copies of the GPL-
licensed work outside of the GPL's prescribed manner, the license is
irrelevant. The license only grants permission for the distribution of
the work according to its terms. If someone distributes the work in a
manner directly in conflict with its terms, then the copyright holder
has not granted any relevant rights to the distributor. If there has
been no grant of rights, the copyright holder may seek remedies for
copyright infringement under federal copyright law. This is the case
when the GPL functions as a bare license.
The Second Circuit has held that, when a copyright license grants
limited rights to the receiver of a work, it is copyright infringement to
use the work in a manner that exceeds the rights granted by the
copyright holder.78  In other words, when a licensee breaks a
copyright license that grants limited rights, there are two possible
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; and (2) copyright
infringement. Professor Nimmer agrees:
If the nature of a licensee's violation consists of a failure to
satisfy a condition to the license (as distinguished from a breach
of a covenant), it follows that the rights dependent upon
satisfaction of such condition have not been effectively licensed,
and therefore, any use by the licensee is without authority from
the licensor and may therefore, constitute an infringement of
79copyright.
7
In this way, when the GPL functions as a bare license, it does not
interfere with, nor is it contrary to copyright law in any way. Rather,
the license merely informs the receiver of the GPL-licensed works of
the exclusive copyright uses that are authorized by the copyright
holder (and that the receiver may undergo without fear of liability
under federal copyright law). Essentially, when the GPL functions as
a bare license, the copyright holder gives some, but not all, of his or
her rights to the receiver. Those rights include: the right to
reproduce, modify, and distribute copies of the original work, as well
as the right to prepare derivative works, and a conditional right to
distribute derivative works. Therefore, credible arguments that the
77. See id.
78. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976).
79. 10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
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GPL is unconstitutional as a bare license must identify how the grant
of this subset of the author's copyrights deprives or interferes with
Congress's power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" or how it interferes with the power to "secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. '
It is well-established in United States copyright law that
"Authors" includes computer programmers and "Writings" includes
original works made in human-readable code, typically referred to as
computer "programs."8 ' Therefore, the Constitution gives Congress
the power to grant to programmers the "exclusive right" to their
82
programs.
One argument that the GPL is unconstitutional is based on the
idea that the profit motive is central to the intent behind the
Copyright Clause.83 This argument mirrors the ideological struggle
between the Free Software and proprietary software communities.
This argument focuses on whether Congress intended to make the
profit motive one of many incentives behind the exclusive copyrights
granted, or whether Congress intended the profit motive to be the
main incentive.84 This position, which was explained by SCO in their
open letter on copyrights, asserts that the GPL is unconstitutional
because congressional authority:
"to promote the Progress of Science and the useful arts..
inherently includes a profit motive, and that protection for this
profit motive includes a Constitutional [sic] dimension. We
believe that the "progress of science" is best advanced by
vigorously protecting the right of authors and inventors to earn
a profit from their work.
Furthermore, if Congress intended the profit motive to be the
only incentive in the copyright system, opponents of the GPL may
have an abuse of copyright defense if they utilize GPL-licensed works
in abrogation of the GPL. Abuse of copyright is an equitable
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "computer program" as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result"); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)
(interpreting "Writings" to require originality, and "Authors" to mean "he to whom
anything owes its origin").
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
83. Darl McBride, President & CEO of The SCO Group, Inc., Open Letter on
Copyrights (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.thescogroup.com/copyright/.
84. Id.
85. Id.
affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim which focuses
on the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright (as opposed
to whether the use is violative of antitrust law). 6 Copyright misuse
does not invalidate the copyright, but it does preclude the
enforcement of copyrights during the period of misuse.87
Those who wrote the House Report on the landmark Copyright
Act of 1909, however, explained the overriding policy and intent
behind the Act, saying that copyright was not designed "primarily" to
"benefit" the "author" or "any particular class of citizens, however
worthy," but was instead "for the benefit of the great body of people,
in that it will stimulate writing and invention."'8 The Supreme Court
has held that there is nothing in the copyright statutes to prevent an
author from "hoarding all of his works during the term of the
copyright." 89 Indeed, "[t]he owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may
refrain from vending or licensing and [sic] content himself with simply
exercising the right to exclude others from using his property." 9°
When a programmer of an original program chooses to license
her work under the GPL, it is, at worst, no less a proper exercise of
her right than the "hoarding all of [her] works during the term of
[her] copyright."' In practice, placing an original work under the
GPL ensures that more people will have access to it and be able to
learn from it than excluding everyone from access to the copyrighted
work during its copyright term. Thus, when authors choose to license
their original works under the GPL, it furthers the "sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
[which] lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors."'
As a bare license, the GPL merely grants permission for the
receiver to copy, distribute, and/or modify the GPL-licensed program
under certain conditions. If those conditions are not met, the license
is irrelevant, because no permission has been granted and the person
who has copied, distributed, and/or modified outside of those
86. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
87. Id.
88. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 247 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1909)).
89. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990).
90. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
91. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 229.
92. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting Fox
Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 33:4
Summer 2006] THE GNU GPL: CONSTITUTIONAL SUBVERSION?
conditions has committed copyright infringement.
In analyzing the GPL's constitutionality, it is instructive to
realize that there are only two ways that a work can come to be
licensed under the GPL: (1) the creator of an original work can
license their work under the GPL; and (2) a creator of a derivative
work can alter an existing work that is currently licensed under the
GPL.9 It would be very difficult, if not impossible to argue that the
GPL, as it applies to the creator of an original work, deprives
Congress of the power to secure copyright terms to the author's work.
Rather than challenging Congress's power to secure an exclusive
copyright to programmers who create new works, the GPL accepts as
true that Congress has secured an exclusive copyright to the work in
the programmer, and as a result, the programmer is free to license the
program as he chooses.
Furthermore, although some have argued otherwise,94 the GPL
does not purport to have the power to circumvent copyright law by
interfering with the exclusive copyright of authors who have not
chosen to license their original works under the GPL: "Thus, it is not
the intent of this section to claim rights or contest your rights to work
written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the right to
control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on the
Program.'
In fact, the GPL relies upon the statutory definition of computer
program copyright infringement as the lease, sale, or other transfer of
a copy or adaptation of a computer program without the
authorization of the copyright owner.96 In defining acceptance of the
license, the GPL notes that if parties use the GPL without accepting
the license, they are doing so in violation of U.S. Copyright law,
because they do not have the authorization of the copyright owner:"
"You are not required to accept this License... . However, nothing
else grants you permission to modify or distribute the Program or its
derivative works. These actions are prohibited by law if you do not
accept this License." 98
93. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 1.
94. Windows IT Pro, SCO Backs Up Claims of Linux IP Theft, June 10, 2003,
http://www.windowsitpro.com/Article/ArticlelD/39258/39258.html.
95. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 2.
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (establishing the
limitations on exclusive rights to computer programs).
97. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 117 (2006).
98. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 5.
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The strongest argument for the GPL's unconstitutionality when
it functions as a bare license is that the conditional grant of
permission to prepare and distribute derivative works is not "for
limited times." It could be argued that because the bare license
purports to apply to derivative' works of derivate works, it takes
Congress's grant of a limited copyright term and extends it in
perpetuity - beyond the constitutionally allowed realm. In Brulotte
v. Thys Co., the Supreme Court held that patent royalties may not be
collected beyond the life of a patent, even if both parties willingly
contract for payments that extend beyond the patent term. 99 By
analogy, if "a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects
beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se," l° then so,
perhaps, is a copyright holder's use of a license that restricts the
future preparation and distribution of derivative works beyond the
expiration date of the copyright term.
When the GPL functions as a bare license, however, it is very
different from the patent royalty agreement in Brulotte. First, the
royalty agreement in Brulotte attempted to extend the patent holder's
monopoly by a contract that extracted private payments for an
invention that legally belonged to the public. The GPL, when it
functions as a bare license, does not attempt to extend the private
monopoly of the author's copyright by forming a tying agreement to
collect future payments. Rather, as a bare license, the GPL gives a
subset of the copyrights held by the author to the receiver. If the
copyright term has expired, the author no longer has a superset of
copyrights from which to give the receiver a subset and thus, the GPL
as a bare license has no effect when the work is beyond its copyright
term.
Second, the majority of the works licensed under the GPL are
software programs. Much of the software licensed under the GPL is
attributed to the author who wrote it, although some works are
unattributed, and others are works for hire. Under the Sonny Bono
Act, the attributed non-for-hire works have terms of the author's life
plus seventy years, while the works for hire and the anonymous works
have terms of at least ninety-five years. As Gordon Moore observed,
the processing capacity of the hardware on which software runs
doubles approximately every two years.101  As a result of this
99. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
100. Id.
101. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
ELECTRONICS Vol. 38, No. 8 (1965), available at ftp://download.intel.com/research/silicon/
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breakneck pace, the field of computer software grows, changes, and
evolves rapidly with each new hardware revision. Consequently, the
average software program ceases to be relevant well before the
expiration of the applicable copyright term and there is little
pragmatic sense in the argument that software copyrights could be
abused by exercise of the exclusive rights in extension of the allowed
term.
Accordingly, when the GPL functions as a bare license, it (1)
relies upon Congress's grant of exclusive copyright to the creators of
original works, (2) does not endorse or encourage the circumvention
of the copyrights of works not licensed under it, and (3) promotes
progress of computer science by allowing those who receive copies of
GPL-licensed work to share the human-readable code with others
who can learn from it as well. Furthermore, as a bare license the GPL
cannot limit the preparation and distribution of derivative works after
the expiration of the copyright term. As such, when applied to
original works as a bare license, the GPL is a constitutional grant of a
subset of the copyright holder's rights.
Federal Pre-emption
Article VI of the Constitution establishes federal law as the
"supreme Law of the Land."' '  Therefore, any state law that
"interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield., 10 3 The GPL
is capable of functioning in two capacities: (1) as a bare license,
before the receiver of the program has accepted its terms; and (2) as a
contract, after the receiver of the program has accepted its terms."
The pre-emption arguments are relevant only to determine whether
an action based on the terms of the GPL for breach of contract under
state law "interferes with or is contrary to federal law." 105
While it functions as a bare license, the GPL is not enforceable,
per se, and the licensor must seek redress in copyright law. In order
for the GPL to be enforceable on its own, an enforceable contract
based upon its terms must be formed. Contracts are governed by
state law, and as such, an action to enforce the GPL will be controlled
moorespaper.pdf.
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
103. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131,138 (1988)).
104. See GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1.
105. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108.
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by the laws of the state where the action is brought.'" In order for the
GPL to function as a contract, there must be a manifestation of
assent, which typically takes the form of an offer (the bare license
terms) and acceptance. '°7 If the receiver of a GPL-licensed work
distributes the work in accordance with the GPL's terms, the act of
distribution functions as a manifestation of assent because the
copyright holder would infer acceptance of the GPL's terms from the
act of complying with those terms."" Although distribution of the
GPL-licensed work according to the GPL's terms is the most obvious
form of assent, a contract may be formed when the receiver promises
to comply with the GPL's terms, or undertakes other actions which
manifest his assent.' 9 After a contract is formed, state contract law is
preempted if the enforcement of the contract is expressly preempted
by federal law or the contract's enforcement is impliedly preempted
by the structure and purpose of federal law."' It is important to note
that the United States Constitution is binding upon governments, not
individuals, and as such, it cannot be unconstitutional for individuals
to enter into a GPL-license agreement, but it could be
unconstitutional for the court system to enforce that agreement. "1
Direct Conflict Pre-emption
Direct conflict pre-emption occurs when the enforcement of a
state law directly conflicts with the enforcement of a federal law." 2 In
other words, it is physically impossible to simultaneously comply with
both the state and federal laws. As discussed above, the GPL is in
perfect agreement with federal law when an author licenses a
completely original work. Conflicts may arise, however, as a result of
the limitations that the license places on derivative works.
106. Subject to the choice of laws of the state, if applicable.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1981).
108. "The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he
intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party
may infer from his conduct that he assents." Id. § 19.
109. "A manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor
acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be
determined." Id. § 22.
110. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 376
(2d ed. 2002).
111. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that racial covenants
between private parties did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the
enforcement of those covenants by the courts would be unconstitutional state action).
112. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 376-78.
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Because original works are not controversial, the primary area of
constitutional debate centers around how the GPL purports to
function in the case of derivative works. The Copyright Act defines a
derivative work as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a "derivative 
work."' 1
The GPL refers to derivative works as "a work based on the
Program," where Program refers to an original work licensed under
the GPL."4 Specifically, the GPL defines derivative works under
copyright law to include "a work containing the Program or a portion
of it, either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into
another language.""5 Copyright law grants authors the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work or to
authorize the preparation of derivative works." 6 Through the GPL,
the author of an original work authorizes the preparation of
derivative works, according to the terms of the GPL."7
The GPL claims to apply to "derivative works" as they are
defined in copyright law."' Generally, software distributors look to
the Free Software Foundation to determine whether derivative works
made from two separately licensed works may be distributed
together."9  This usually requires a determination of whether the
license of the work seeking to be combined with the GPL-licensed
work is "compatible."'2 Because the GPL requires that all derivative
works be licensed under the terms of the GPL, any license that does
not allow its derivative works to be licensed under GPL terms is
incompatible. The GPL explicitly states that, if you distribute a
113. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
114. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 0.
115. "Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in the term
,modification."' id.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
117. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 2.
118. "'[W]ork based on the Program' means either the Program or any derivative work
under copyright law." Id. § 0.
119. See, e.g., Mozilla Relicensing FAQ, http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/relicensing-
faq.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
120. Id.
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whole work, and some part of that work is derivative of work licensed
under the GPL, then the entire distribution "of the whole must be on
the terms of this License, whose permissions for other licensees
extend to the entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless
of who wrote it.'
121
The majority of the fear surrounding the GPL is directed to this
requirement that all derivative works made from the GPL be licensed
under the GPL as well.2 2 Opponents argue that these terms cause a
problem, because they could require that existing copyrights be
subverted simply because one who is not the holder of the copyright
distributes it in combination with GPL-licensed code.23 If the GPL
does purport to authorize the distribution of copyrighted works
without the permission of the copyright holders, its enforcement
would be in direct conflict with Title 17 of the United States Code,
and therefore a state legal action enforcing the contract would be
unconstitutional, so it must be preempted.'24 However, according to
its own terms, no work may be licensed under the GPL without the
permission of the copyright holder. 25  In order for unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted works to occur under the GPL, the
copyright holder must authorize the license of the work under the
GPL. 26 If the distribution and licensing is authorized, by definition, it
does not circumvent copyright law by purporting to legalize the
unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted work.
The analogous argument would be that a proprietary fee-for-use
license is unconstitutional simply because one could distribute and
attempt to license copyrighted works without authorization under it.
The more proper analysis, of course, is to recognize that because the
distribution was unauthorized, the copying and distribution of the
work is copyright infringement and the license predicated upon that
infringement is invalid. The same analysis applies to the GPL.
121. General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 2.
122. Id.
123. "SCO intends to fully protect its rights granted under these Acts against all who
would use and distribute our intellectual property for free, and would strip out copyright
management information from our proprietary code, use it in Linux, and distribute it
under the GPL." Darl McBride, supra note 83.
124. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2006).
125. "This License applies to any program or other work which contains a notice
placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed under the terms of this General
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Unfortunately, due to the fundamental ideological differences
between the proprietary software and Free Software communities,
unauthorized licensing accusations rarely undergo a logical process to
determine whether the copying was authorized, and instead typically
become public "flame wars" involving accusations of simple theft.'
27
Although opponents believe otherwise, the GPL explicitly
forbids the incorporation of protected intellectual property into
derivative works derived from GPL-licensed code if the incorporation
results in legally required additions or conditions that conflict with
the GPL:
If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent
issues), conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order,
agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this
License, they do not excuse you from the conditions of this
License. If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
your obligations under this License and any other pertinent
obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the
Program at all. For example, if a patent license would not
permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by all those
who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then the
only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to
121refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.8
This license term prevents the GPL from directly conflicting with
copyright law, patent law, and contract law (where existing licenses
cover a work which is attempted to be included in a GPL-licensed
work). Basically, the GPL cannot be in direct conflict with federal
law as a result of combinations of GPL-licensed work with other
works because it refuses to extend its own terms to the distribution of
any derivative work that would result in direct conflict pre-emption.
While the extension of copyright term argument based on
Brulotte129 can be avoided in the case of the bare license, it is much
more problematic when the GPL functions as a contract. The tying
agreement requiring that all future derivative works must be
distributed according to its terms appears to make it unconstitutional
for the same reason as the royalty agreement governing the machines
in Brulotte. The GPL purports to require that all its terms apply to all
derivative works, even those derivative works prepared outside the
127. A Matter of Inspiration, http://www.icsharpcode.net/pub/relations/
amatterofinspiration.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
128. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
129. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
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term of the copyright of the work whose license purports to bind the
future preparations. In effect, the GPL attempts to utilize the
exclusive rights in the copyrighted material to require that creators
give up their exclusive rights of distribution in the future.
If Brulotte is read narrowly, the GPL can be distinguished. First,
the GPL does not tie the "purchase or sale" of the future derivative
works to the use or sale of GPL-licensed work. Second the GPL does
not attempt to project the "royalty payments" for the GPL-licensed
work beyond the copyright term. However, if Brulotte is read more
generally, enforcement of the GPL is an unconstitutional extension of
the copyright term. It is irrelevant that the "royalty payment"
extracted by the GPL is in the form of future exclusive rights. Any
payment for the exclusive rights defined by copyright law is a royalty
payment, and a contract that seeks to extract royalties beyond the
congressionally mandated term of a copyright or patent is
unconstitutional, so the analysis in Brulotte is directly on point.
Accordingly, to the extent that the GPL attempts to govern the
distribution of derivative works that are prepared beyond the
copyright term, it is unenforceable because it is unconstitutional."3
However, as discussed above, due to the speed with which software
becomes obsolete, it is unlikely that anyone would try to enforce one
of the exclusive rights of copyright beyond the copyright term.
In sum, outside of the extremely unlikely case where a GPL-
licensed work would be used to extend the exclusive right to prepare
and distribute derivative works to a time past the expiration of the
copyright term, direct conflict pre-emption does not apply.
Field Pre-emption
In addition to direct conflict pre-emption, a state law can be
preempted by implied conflict pre-emption and field pre-emption.'3'
Field pre-emption occurs "where the scheme of federal regulation is
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it." '132 Congress enacted the first
federal patent and copyright law in 1790, and the Supreme Court has
stated that:
These laws, like other laws of the United States enacted
pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the
130. Id. at 30 (reversing opinion below insofar as it allowed royalties to be collected
which accrued after the last of the patents incorporated into the machines had.expired).
131. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 376-78.
132. Id. at 98.
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land. When state law touches upon the area of these federal
statutes, it is "familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may
not be set at naught, or its benefits denied" by the state law.
This is true, of course, even if the state law is enacted in the
exercise of otherwise undoubted state power.13
Software works under the Copyright Act of 1976 are commonly
licensed under state contract law. These licenses have been held to
be enforceable in both shrinkwrap and click-through form. In 1996,
the Seventh Circuit held that a shrinkwrap end user license
agreement ("EULA") of copyrighted code was enforceable and not
preempted."' In September 2004, one district court held a click-
through EULA to be enforceable .' The Second Circuit, however,
analyzed a browse-through license and found it to be unenforceable
for failure to require a manifestation of assent. 6 Perhaps the most
informative case regarding field pre-emption of copyright law and
software license agreements comes from the Ninth Circuit, where a
license governing the use of copyrighted software was held to be
breached under state contract law, and the case was remanded for
determination of whether defendant simultaneously infringed
plaintiff's copyright as well.'37
Congress has not completely occupied the field of the GPL's
application. When field pre-emption applies, "federal law is exclusive
in the area and preempts state laws even if they serve the same
purposes as the federal law and do not impede the implementation of
federal law.' 3' The cases discussed above show that federal law is not
exclusive in the area of copyright-based contracts governing the use
and distribution of software, but rather that Congress intended to
legislate in a manner that did not completely preclude the
enforcement of contracts governing the field of the use of software
covered by federal copyright. Therefore, field pre-emption is not a
wholesale bar to the enforcement of contracts predicated upon
federal copyright law, and as such, the enforcement of the GPL is not
subject to field pre-emption.
133. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (citations omitted).
134. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
135. Davidson & Assocs. Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
136. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (click-through
license held unenforceable, but analyzed from the perspective that it could have been
enforceable).
137. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1989).
138. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 386.
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Implied Pre-emption
Even when there is no direct conflict pre-emption, and courts
have determined that Congress did not intend to exclusively regulate
the field, implied pre-emption may still be found if a state law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes or objectives of Congress." '39 Accordingly, the key inquiry
for implied pre-emption is whether the enforcement of the GPL is
contrary to congressional intent in enacting the Copyright Act.
Legislative history shows that Congress enacted and amended
the 1976 Copyright Act in furtherance of the constitutional command
that it "create a 'system' that 'promote[s] the Progress of Science."'1 4 °
The House Judiciary Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 states the
following:
Pre-emption of State Law. The intention of section 301 is to
preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or
statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that
extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal
copyright law. The declaration of this principle in section 301 is
intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal
language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress
shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of any
vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.
Accordingly, section 301 of the Copyright Act must be construed
strictly.'
42
In National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates
International, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that the copyright system
created by Congress allows for the negotiation of license agreements
governing the use of copyrighted software.143 The district court held
that the licensor's breach of contract claim was preempted by 17
U.S.C. § 301(a),'" which in relevant part states:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
139. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
140. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
141. Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 290 n.8 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 130 (1976), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746).
142. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
143. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.
1993).
144. Id. at 428.
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specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103... are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
145
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the contract governed
activities other than those defined as the exclusive rights in
copyright. 146 Specifically, the court noted that the cause of action, as
pled, did not allege any of the activities listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106,'7
which would be required to state a claim for copyright infringement.
14
1
Since the breach of contract claim did not rely on any of the rights
secured by copyright law, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that
the contract claim was not preempted.1 9 In doing so, the court relied
in part on congressional intent:
We believe that the legislative history of the Copyright Act
supports this conclusion. In elaborating the meaning of the term
"equivalent rights" the House committee report to the
Copyright Act suggests that breaches of contract were not
generally preempted: "nothing in the bill derogates from the
rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue for
breaches of contract.
1 50
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed a case regarding
pre-emption of contracts governing copyrighted software, the Court
has stated that the Copyright Act has an "express objective of
creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state
statutory and common-law copyright regulation." '51 In keeping with
the Supreme Court's classification of congressional intent, a majority
of circuits have joined the Eighth Circuit in embracing the "extra
element" test for determining whether federal copyright law
preempts state law claims. 152
145. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
146. National, 991 F.2d at 432-33.
147. The relevant exclusive rights for software are: (1) the right to reproduce copies,
(2) the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, and (3) to
distribute copies.
148. National, 991 F.2d at 430.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 433 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132, as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5748).
151. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 301(a)).
152. See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283,288 (6th Cir. 2005); Dunlap v. G&L Holding
Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 93-94 (11th Cir. 2004); Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446,
Under the "extra element test," 17 U.S.C. § 106 is considered a
floor that state breach of contract claims may build upon. A state law
claim is preempted by federal copyright law if (1) the subject matter
of the state law claim falls within the subject matter of the copyright
laws as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-03, and (2) the state law creates
rights which are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights granted to
the copyright holder by 17 U.S.C. § 106.153 In order for a contract
claim to survive the extra element test, the contract breach must
require an extra element instead of or in addition to the acts of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of the copyrighted
work.1 4
The Seventh Circuit is alone in its refusal to explicitly adopt the
"extra element test" stating, "one cannot simply call every element in
a state statute (or otherwise extracted from state common law) an
'element' and conclude that the statute includes 'extra elements' and
should not be preempted."'55 However, in application, the Seventh
Circuit's test is essentially the same as the "extra element" test in that,
"to avoid pre-emption, a state law must regulate conduct qualitatively
distinguishable from that governed by federal copyright law - i.e.,
conduct other than reproduction, adaptation, publication,
performance, and display.'
5 6
Applying the extra element test is straightforward. For example,
in Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri addressed a complicated breach
of contract and copyright infringement case and held, in reliance on
National, that the terms of use and EULA governing the software
created contractual restrictions that did not exist in copyright law.
157
Thus, an action for breach of the contract in Davidson was not
456 (5th Cir. 2003); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Dun
& Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 216-18 (3d Cir.
2002); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1303-04 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Samara
Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 1998); Harolds Stores, Inc.
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1542-43 (10th Cir. 1996); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1993); Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner,
Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. See supra notes 134-44.
154. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B]
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
155. Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486,491 (7th Cir. 2004).
156. Id.
157. Davidson & Assocs. Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
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preempted by federal law because the action for breach required
proof of an "extra-element" in addition to the necessary elements of
§ 106.
In the case of the GPL, because the majority of GPL-licensed
works are software programs,58 they are explicitly within the
Copyright Act's coverage, and the first prong of the "extra-element"
test is easily satisfied. The second prong of the extra-element test
requires that the elements of proof to state a cause of action based on
the GPL's terms be identified and compared against the exclusive
rights of copyright iterated in 17 U.S.C. § 106. 59 When identifying the
necessary elements of a cause of action for breach of contract, one
must interpret a copyright license narrowly'60 Read narrowly, the
GPL establishes three ways that a licensee could fail to comply with
the agreement and create a cause of action for breach of contract: the
licensee could (1) distribute copies of a GPL-licensed work while
failing to comply with the GPL's terms of distribution,161 (2) distribute
derivative works of the GPL-licensed work while failing to comply
with the GPL's terms of distribution for derivative works,62 or (3)
distribute a copy of a GPL-licensed work or a derivative work such
that it is subject to additional legal conditions other than those
defined by the GPL (including patent royalty obligations).163
Failure to comply with any one of these terms involves
distribution of copies, preparation of derivative works, and/or
distribution of derivative works in a manner that would allow the
copyright holder to set out a claim for copyright infringement under
17 U.S.C. § 106. Therefore, the GPL fails to state an extra element
that will allow for a breach of contract claim in jurisdictions that apply
the "extra element" test. Thus, the GPL is preempted by federal
copyright law and its enforcement as a contract under state law is
preempted.
158. See supra notes 59-61.
159. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428-29
(8th Cir. 1993) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200
(2d Cir. 1983)).
160. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal.
1991), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995).
161. GNU General Public License, Version 2, supra note 1, §§ 1, 3
162. Id. at §§ 2-3.
163. Id. at §§ 6-7.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Conclusion
Challenges to the GNU General Public License alleging that it is
unconstitutional are properly divided into two categories: those
alleging that the bare license granted by the GPL is unconstitutional,
and those alleging that enforcing the GPL under state contract law is
unconstitutional. When it functions as a bare license, the GPL is the
tool through which the copyright holder grants a subset of her
exclusive rights to the receiver. As a bare license, the GPL is in
parallel with the Copyright Clause of Article I of the United States
Constitution because it relies upon existing federal copyright law to
ensure that the copyright holder's work is distributed according to the
copyright holder's wishes. If someone attempts to distribute the
copyrighted work in a manner outside of the GPL's terms as a bare
license, the GPL does not grant any permission for that distribution,
and as such, the copyright holder may pursue an action under federal
copyright law for copyright infringement.
Although the GPL, if enforced as a contract, could be viewed as
part of the "system" that "promotes the Progress of Science, '64 the
most credible unconstitutionality claims argue that the GPL's
enforcement as a contract is contrary to and preempted by federal
copyright law. Direct conflict pre-emption does not apply because it
is possible to simultaneously satisfy federal copyright law and the
terms of the GPL. Field pre-emption does not apply because
software licensing agreements governing the use and/or distribution
of copyrighted software have been repeatedly held to be enforceable
by federal courts. However, federal copyright law impliedly preempts
enforcement of the GPL as a contract because the GPL fails the pass
the "extra element" test. Any action arising out of the GPL as an
enforceable contract requires the same elements of proof as an action
under 17 U.S.C. § 106 for copyright infringement, and as such, the
GPL is preempted from being an enforceable contract under state law
because the action is properly brought under federal copyright law.
Accordingly, when it functions as a bare license, the GPL is a
constitutional, conditional grant of rights from the copyright holder.
However, attempts to enforce the GPL as a contract under state law
would be null and void because the GPL is preempted by federal
copyright law under Article VI of the United States Constitution.
164. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
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